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Introduction 
 
Secularisation theory, once sociology of religion’s proud theoretical flagship, has run 
into stormy weather since the 1980s. Once considered an empirically sound theory by 
the social-scientific community, many now feel that it has been exposed as a mere 
ideology or wish dream, intimately tied to the rationalist discourse of modernity (e.g., 
Hadden, 1987; Stark and Finke, 2000; Meyer and Pels, 2003). It is hardly contested, to 
be sure, that church membership, adherence to traditional Christian doctrines and 
values, and participation in church rituals relating to birth, marriage, and death, have all 
declined considerably in Western-European countries. But precisely because of the one-
sided attention to those prominent processes of religious decline, it is still quite unclear 
whether ‘new’ or ‘alternative’ types of religion have come to blossom outside the 
traditional Christian realm (e.g., Luckmann, 2003; Knoblauch, 2003; Stark et al., 2005). 
Some observers have recently argued that such is indeed the case. What we are 
witnessing today, they argue, is not simply a process of secularisation, but rather a 
decline of traditional Christian religion that goes along with a slowly unfolding spiritual 
revolution (Houtman and Mascini, 2002; Heelas et al., 2004).1 Contemporary 
spirituality is held to be an outgrowth of what emerged as the ‘New Age’ movement in 
the 1960s’ counter culture as an offshoot of the tradition of Western esotericism 
 3
(Roszak, 1969; Zijderveld, 1970; Hanegraaff, 1996).2 With its gradual disembedding 
from this countercultural fringe, New Age has since expanded into the very centre of 
late-modern culture (Van Otterloo, 1999). Sutcliffe and Bowman do not even seem to 
exaggerate when they observe that ‘contrary to predictions that New Age would go 
mainstream, now it’s as if the mainstream is going New Age’ (2000: 11). The once 
typical belief in a dawning ‘New Age of Aquarius’ has waned in the process and the 
‘New Age’ label has increasingly been replaced by that of ‘spirituality’. 
 Unfortunately, there is hardly any hard evidence that spirituality has indeed 
become more widespread. Houtman and Mascini (2002), for instance, rely on one-shot-
survey data, interpreting differences between age categories as processes of historical 
change. Heelas et al. (2004) offer convincing evidence, but assume that the bulk of 
spirituality can be found in the spiritual milieu – an assumption that seems unduly 
restrictive.3 Judging from its virtual omnipresence on the internet and its prominence in 
contemporary business life, for instance, spirituality has by now moved well beyond the 
boundaries of the spiritual milieu (Aupers and Houtman, 2005; Aupers and Houtman, 
2006; Aupers et al., submitted for publication). A first aim of the present chapter, then, 
is to provide evidence for the spread of spirituality during the last few decades by 
studying spiritual beliefs and self-designations among the general populations of 
Western countries. 
 This chapter’s more important second aim is to refine Houtman and Mascini’s 
(2002) theory that the spread of spirituality is caused by a process of 
detraditionalisation. This refinement is called for, because in its original form it cannot 
explain the high levels of affinity with spirituality among women (although it does a 
good job in explaining those among the younger age cohorts and the well educated). 
With men and women being identical when it comes to levels of post-traditionalism, the 
question why women nevertheless display more affinity with spirituality than men 
remains ‘an intriguing and theoretically important puzzle to be solved’ (Houtman and 
Mascini, 2002: 468). Solving this ‘gender puzzle’ (Heelas et al., 2004) requires 
gendering the theory of detraditionalisation (see also Woodhead 2005, forthcoming 
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2006). The second aim of the present chapter, in short, is to develop and test a gendered 
version of the theory of detraditionalisation. 
 
 
Conceptualising Contemporary Spirituality 
 
Writings about contemporary spirituality typically invoke an image of a veritable 
implosion of religion and consumer choice, speaking of ‘do-it-yourself-religion’ 
(Baerveldt, 1996), ‘pick-and-mix religion’ (Hamilton, 2000), ‘religious consumption à 
la carte’ (Possamai, 2003) or a ‘spiritual supermarket’ (Lyon, 2000). This type of 
discourse is even used by defenders of secularisation theory and New Agers, two 
otherwise radically different groups. The former use it to construct spirituality’s 
widespread contemporary presence as confirming rather than contradicting 
secularisation theory: ‘The New Age is eclectic to an unprecedented degree and ... is ... 
dominated by the principle that the sovereign consumer will decide what to believe ... . I 
cannot see how a shared faith can be created from a low-salience world of pick-and-mix 
religion’ (Bruce, 2002: 105).4 New Age apologetics use this type of discourse to 
highlight the enormous variety within the spiritual milieu, so as to emphasise its 
openness to diversity and seemingly unprecedented opportunities for individual choice 
and liberty, characterising the Christian churches as dogmatic and authoritarian in the 
process. The following explanation of a spiritual trainer of a Dutch New Age centre 
provides a good illustration:5  
 
New Age is like a religious supermarket. All aspects of religion … are put 
together on a big pile and people can choose what is best for them at that 
moment in time. And that’s the good thing about the New Age world – that 
nobody claims to have a monopoly on wisdom. Whereas the old religions 
argue “We possess the absolute truth and this is the only way to God”, we say 
“There are ten thousand ways” and “There are as many ways as there are 
people”.  
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 Although, to be sure, those positions are not completely mistaken, they overestimate the 
individualistic character of spirituality. True, the well-packed shelves of the spiritual 
supermarket enable one to sample one’s personal spiritual diet, but underneath the 
resulting diversity lies a shared belief that has been neglected all too often: ‘The great 
refrain, running throughout the New Age, is that we malfunction because we have been 
indoctrinated (…) by mainstream society and culture’ (Heelas, 1996: 18). The latter are 
thus conceived of as basically alienating forces, held to estrange one from one’s 
‘authentic’, ‘natural’ or ‘real’ self – from who one ‘really’ or ‘at deepest’ is: 
 
Perfection can be found only by moving beyond the socialised self – widely 
known as the ‘ego’ but also as the ‘lower self’, ‘intellect’ or the ‘mind’ – 
thereby encountering a new realm of being. It is what we are by nature. Indeed, 
the most pervasive and significant aspect of the lingua franca of the New Age 
is that the person is, in essence, spiritual. To experience the ‘Self’ itself is to 
experience … ‘inner spirituality’. … The inner realm, and the inner realm 
alone, is held to serve as the source of authentic vitality, creativity, love, 
tranquillity, wisdom, power, authority and all those other qualities which are 
held to comprise the perfect life (Heelas, 1996: 19, his emphasis, DH/SA). 
 
This, then, is the key tenet of spirituality: the belief that in the deepest layers of the self 
the ‘divine spark’ – to borrow a term from ancient Gnosticism – is still smouldering, 
waiting to be stirred up and succeed the socialised self. This constitutes a basically 
romanticist conception of the self that ‘lays central stress on unseen, even sacred forces 
that dwell within the person, forces that give life and relationships their significance’ 
(Gergen, 1991: 19). Re-establishing contact with such a ‘true’, ‘deeper’ or ‘divine’ self 
is held to enable one to reconnect to a sacred realm that holistically connects 
‘everything’ and to overcome one’s present state of alienation. No wonder, then, that 
spirituality is deeply influenced by humanistic psychology and that ‘… “personal 
growth” can be understood as the shape “religious salvation” takes in the New Age 
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Movement: it is affirmed that deliverance from human suffering and weakness will be 
reached by developing our human potential, which results in our increasingly getting in 
touch with our inner divinity’ (Hanegraaff, 1996: 46). 
This ‘sacralisation of the self’ encourages people to ‘follow their personal 
paths’, rather than conform to authoritative role models. Those concerned do not pursue 
meaning and identity from ‘pre-given’ sources located outside the self (e.g., the 
institutionalised answers offered by the Christian churches), but want to rely on an 
‘internal’ source, located in the self’s deeper layers. As such, spirituality conceives of 
itself as an epistemological third way of ‘gnosis’, rejecting both religious faith and 
scientific reason as vehicles of truth. Rather, it is held that one should be faithful to 
one’s ‘inner voice’ and trust one’s ‘intuition’: 
 
According to (gnosis) truth can only be found by personal, inner revelation, 
insight or ‘enlightenment’. Truth can only be personally experienced: in 
contrast with the knowledge of reason or faith, it is in principle not generally 
accessible. This ‘inner knowing’ cannot be transmitted by discursive language 
(this would reduce it to rational knowledge). Nor can it be the subject of faith 
… because there is in the last resort no other authority than personal, inner 
experience (Hanegraaff, 1996: 519, his emphasis, DH/SA). 
 
Although the emergence of a pluralistic spiritual supermarket confirms Luckmann’s 
(1967) classical predictions, it has simultaneously blinded many observers to the shared 
tenet of self-spirituality – the belief that the self itself is sacred. It is precisely this idea 
that not only accounts for the diversity at the surface of the spiritual milieu – an 
inevitable outcome when people feel that they need to follow their personal paths and 
explore what works for them personally –, but that also provides it with unity at a 
deeper level. Spirituality is certainly individualistic, in short, but it is so neither because 
a shared worldview is absent, nor because those concerned are as authentic as they 
typically believe they are. It is individualistic because of its shared idea that personal 
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authenticity needs to be attained by expressing a ‘real’ self, basically ‘unpolluted’ by 
culture, history and society. 
 
 
Mapping the Spiritual Revolution 
 
The World Values Survey (1981-2000) 
Studies about spirituality are typically based on qualitative research, employing semi-
structured interviews, ethnography, case studies, content analysis, etcetera. Those 
studies do not permit a systematic comparison of countries and periods, so as to find out 
whether spirituality has indeed become more widespread within a particular country, 
whether the same applies to other countries, and in which countries it has expanded 
most. These types of questions, addressed in the current chapter, require survey data and 
quantitative research methods. 
Although good scales for the measurement of spirituality have become available 
during the last few years (e.g., Granqvist and Hagekull, 2001; Houtman and Mascini, 
2002), such scales are unfortunately absent from the large international survey programs 
that enable comparisons between countries and across time. The World Values Survey 
(WVS) is no exception to this general rule and hence precludes a theoretically 
sophisticated measurement of the extent to which one identifies with spirituality. We 
nevertheless feel that it can be used to measure it in a satisfactory, albeit crude, way by 
strategically combining answers to some of its questions. And whereas no better data 
sources are available to satisfy our research needs, we feel that some pragmatism is 
justified– especially so, because the data of the World Values Survey are otherwise 
perfectly suited for our purposes. This is so for three reasons. 
 Firstly, the three available waves of the WVS (1981, 1990 and 2000) cover a 
range of twenty years. Of course, one would prefer to also have comparable data for 
1970, or even earlier. But then again, twenty years is quite an impressive time span, 
especially if we realise that the large surveys fielded today hardly include better 
measures for spirituality. Moreover, it is often argued that the expansion of spirituality 
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has particularly taken place during the 1980s (e.g., Hanegraaff, 1996; York, 1995), after 
its first emergence in the 1960s and 1970s counter culture (e.g., Roszak, 1969; 
Zijderveld, 1970). Secondly, the WVS covers a substantial number of countries. 
Obviously, not all of those have been included in all three rounds of data collection, not 
all of those are Western countries with a Christian heritage and the crucial questions 
have not always been asked. We nevertheless have sufficient data to map and explain 
the spiritual revolution in fourteen Western countries: France, Great Britain, West-
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, United States, Canada, 
Norway, Sweden and Iceland.6 A third reason why the WVS perfectly meets our needs, 
is that it strongly emphasises the measurement of adherence to traditional moral values. 
This makes it highly useful for testing our theory on why a spiritual revolution has 
occurred in the first place, as we will explain below. 
 
Measuring Spirituality 
The questionnaire of the World Values Survey contains one very simple question that 
explicitly and unambiguously taps spirituality as distinguished from traditional 
Christian religion. Respondents have been asked which of the following four statements 
comes closest to their personal beliefs: ‘There is a personal God’, ‘There is some sort of 
spirit or life force’, ‘I don’t really know what to think’ and ‘I don’t really think there is 
any sort of spirit, God, or life force’. The second answer, belief in some sort of spirit or 
life force, implies belief in the immanence of the sacred – in stark contrast to traditional 
Christianity’s belief that ‘The truth is “out there” rather than within; … transcendent 
rather than immanent’ (Heelas et al. 2004: 22). Indeed, those who answer that they 
believe in ‘some sort of spirit or life force’ prove to score substantially higher on a valid 
and reliable scale for New Age affinity than those who give any of the three other 
answers (Houtman and Mascini, 2002: 462-463). 
 Although the questionnaire contains no other questions that explicitly and 
unambiguously tap affinity with spirituality, we feel that four additional dichotomous 
indicators can be constructed by capitalising on the circumstance that spirituality sets 
itself apart from both the Christian churches and secularist rationalism (e.g., Hanegraaff, 
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1996). Consequently, answers that may crudely indicate spirituality, but may also tap 
less orthodox Christian affinities, can further be polished by combining them with 
answers that unambiguously reveal that one critically distances oneself from the 
Christian church. Likewise, answers indicating such a critical distance can be polished 
by combining them with answers that indicate a rejection of secularist rationalism. The 
former strategy enables us to demarcate spirituality from Christianity; the latter to 
demarcate a rejection of the Christian churches from secularist rationalism. 
The first additional indicator arrived at in this way robs the belief of a life after 
death from its traditional Christian associations by combining it with the feeling that the 
churches do not give adequate answers to people’s spiritual needs. We take the 
combination of belief in a life after death and this criticism of the churches to indicate 
spirituality and the three remaining combinations to indicate its absence. The second 
additional indicator combines a belief in reincarnation (a principal tenet of New Age, 
closely related to the belief in an immortal self) with an absence of belief in God 
(compare Heelas, 1996: 112). Those first two additional indicators solve the awkward 
problem of demarcating the boundary between spirituality and secular-humanist 
conceptions of ‘expressive individualism’ (e.g., Bellah et al. 1985; see on this boundary 
problem: Heelas, 1996: 115-117). Both indicators are precisely convincing, because 
they do not simply tap (arguably secular) self-expression as a key value, but indeed 
express belief in the existence of a self that is essentially immortal. 
 The circumstance that spirituality presents itself as an alternative for both 
Christian religion (‘faith’) and secularist rationalism (‘reason’) is used to construct two 
further additional indicators. Both capture the idea of spirituality as a third way beyond 
faith and reason. The first has been constructed by cross-tabulating whether or not one 
considers oneself a convinced atheist (reason) and whether or not one belongs to a 
religious denomination (faith). We take a rejection of both of those identities (not 
belonging to a religious denomination, but not considering oneself a convinced atheist 
either) to indicate spirituality, coding the three remaining categories as its absence. 
Likewise, we conceive of having no or not very much confidence in the churches, 
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although not considering oneself a convinced atheist, as a final indicator for spirituality. 
Table 1 displays the five resulting indicators. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
More than 40 per cent consider themselves neither convinced atheists, nor have 
confidence in the churches. As such, this indicator generates the highest level of 
spirituality. At the other end, a mere 3 per cent believe in re-incarnation but do not 
believe in God. The three remaining indicators take up positions between those two 
extremes. We do not claim that a combination of those five dichotomous indicators 
constitutes a theoretically sophisticated measurement of spirituality. What we do claim 
is that an index based on those indicators can serve as a crude measure that can 
meaningfully be used for our purposes: mapping and explaining the spiritual revolution 
in fourteen Western countries since 1981.7
 All five dichotomous indicators (1: spirituality; 0: no spirituality) have first been 
standardised and next combined into an index ranging 0 through 10. Correcting for the 
number of valid scores, scores have been assigned to all respondents with a valid score 
on at least three of those five indicators. For one of the 42 year-country combinations – 
Norway, 2000 – scores could not be assigned due to missing values. This produces 
measurements of affinity with spirituality for 92 per cent of the 61 352 respondents.  
 
Results 
Table 2 displays the distribution of spirituality across the fourteen countries and three 
years. Italy, Canada and Iceland prove exceptions to the general pattern of change that 
emerges in that spirituality has declined in those three countries since 1981.8 With the 
exception of those three countries, however, the general pattern of change is clear 
enough. In the eleven remaining countries spirituality has become more widespread 
since 1981. The overall trend confirms the idea that a spiritual revolution has been 
going on during the last two decades. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Spirituality has expanded most in the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and the United 
States. In the latter two countries, despite this substantial growth, it was least 
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widespread in 1981 and those two countries still lag behind today (only for Italy, in 
which spirituality has declined since 1981, lower levels of affinity are found in 2000). 
The countries that lead the way with highest levels of affinity with spirituality are 
France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden. It is clear from those findings that 
spirituality has become more widespread since 1981, confirming the occurrence of a 
spiritual revolution in late modernity. 
But are we really dealing with a process of historical change here? Are 
differences across this twenty-year period really caused by an intergenerational 
replacement of older age cohorts with typically Christian affinities by younger age 
cohorts with spiritual ones? Because our data cover a time range of twenty years and 
because of the large number of respondents, we can distinguish age from birth year and, 
hence, disentangle ‘age effects’ and ‘cohort effects’.9 This enables us to test whether the 
higher levels of affinity with spirituality in the most recent period are caused by cohort 
replacement. 
 We have done so by means of multilevel analysis with Maximum Likelihood 
estimation. This method of analysis is used to analyse so-called ‘nested’ data, i.e., data 
in which cases defined at a lower level (typically, and also in this case, respondents) are 
embedded in contexts defined at a higher level (in this case: combinations of countries 
and years). Multilevel analysis enables one to assess the importance of both levels for 
explaining a variable defined at the individual level, to find out which contextual and 
individual variables are (most) consequential and to analyse whether the effects of 
variables defined at the individual level vary across contexts. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]  
All variables have been standardised so as to produce standardised regression 
coefficients (betas) that enable a straightforward comparison of the strengths of the 
effects found. In this case, aimed at the explanation of individual-level spirituality, the 
explanatory role of the contextual level proves limited. Only about 6 per cent of the 
differences at the individual level can be attributed to differences between the years and 
countries, whereas the remaining 94 per cent is caused by individual characteristics 
(Table 3). Table 3 demonstrates that the higher level of spirituality in the more recent 
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period emerges from the circumstance that respondents who most typically embrace 
spirituality have been born more recently (model 4 as compared to model 2). This 
means that the spiritual revolution is driven by cohort replacement: younger age cohorts 
with stronger affinities with spirituality have replaced older age cohorts with more 
typically Christian affinities. 
 
 
Explaining the Spiritual Revolution 
 
Detraditionalisation and the Sacralisation of the Self 
Despite its shortcomings, to be discussed below, conventional secularisation theory 
offers a fruitful point of departure for explaining the spiritual revolution. It is hardly 
contested, after all, that a process of rationalisation has undermined religion’s grip on 
social life (e.g., Wilson, 1982; Luckmann, 1967, 2003). This is so, because 
rationalisation entails institutional differentiation: social functions are increasingly dealt 
with by specialised institutions. With increased specialisation and institutional 
separation of the economy, the family, the state, science, art, etcetera, those increasingly 
come to be governed by their own particular institutional logic (compare Bell, 1976). 
This causes a value pluralism that erodes the unquestioned legitimacy of the traditional 
moral values bound up with the Christian tradition that once morally overarched all of 
society as a sort of ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger, 1967). 
The ensuing process of ‘detraditionalisation’ (Heelas, 1995) or 
‘individualisation’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) is not simply the aggregated 
result of individual choice or desire, in short, but a more or less inevitable outcome – 
‘Individualization is a fate, not a choice’, as Bauman (2002: xvi) aptly remarks. As the 
grip of external and authoritative sources of meaning and identity declines, the range of 
biographical and lifestyle options nevertheless widens considerably: ‘It is … (the) level 
of pre-conscious “collective habitualizations”, of matters taken for granted, that is 
breaking down into a cloud of possibilities to be thought about and negotiated. The deep 
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layer of foreclosed decisions is being forced up into the level of decision making’ (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 6). 
 Although all of the foregoing is by and large agreed upon, two radically different 
theoretical positions can be distinguished as far as the consequences for individual 
religiosity are concerned. The first, secularisation theory, assumes that Christian 
religiosity and traditional moral values give way to a sort of rationalist worldview: 
‘People increasingly think that they can control and manipulate “their” world. They act 
more in terms of insight, knowledge, controllability, planning and technique and less in 
terms of faith (Dobbelaere, 1993: 15, our translation from Dutch, DH/SA). In a similar 
vein, the late Bryan Wilson claims that ‘(i)n contemporary society, the young come to 
regard morality – any system of ethical norms – as somewhat old-fashioned. For many 
young people, problems of any kind have technical and rational solutions’ (1982: 136). 
Conceiving of rationalism as the ‘other’ of religion, in short, this logic of secularisation 
extends the process of rationalisation to the level of individual consciousness. Given 
this theory’s prominence in the recent past, there is embarrassingly little evidence that 
supports this assumption, however. More than that, ‘… a diminishing faith in rationality 
and a diminishing confidence that science and technology will help solve humanity’s 
problems … has advanced farthest in the economically and technologically most 
advanced societies’ (Inglehart, 1997: 79). 
 Although the assumption that rationalism replaces religion as a worldview may 
thus simply be mistaken, our ambition here is to explain a spiritual rather than a 
rationalist revolution. This is where a second theoretical logic comes in, that argues that 
the declining grip of external and authoritative sources of meaning and identity robs 
late-modern individuals of the protective cloak of ‘pre-given’ meaning and identity and 
throws them back upon themselves in dealing with their ‘precarious freedoms’ (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 1992: 16). Under those circumstances, nagging questions haunt 
those who crave for the solidly founded answers that the late-modern condition 
precludes: ‘What is it that I really want?’, ‘Is this really the sort of life I want to live?’, 
‘What sort of person am I, really?’. Because it is ultimately only one’s feelings and 
intuitions that remain as sources of answers to those questions, ‘a shift of authority: 
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from “without” to “within”’ (Heelas, 1995: 2) easily takes place, driving a voyage of 
discovery to the deeper layers of the self. And as we have seen above, this is precisely 
the key tenet of spirituality: the belief that ‘real’ meaning and ‘real’ identity can only be 
derived from such an ‘internal’ source. 
 
Detraditionalisation and the Gender Puzzle 
The well-established research finding that spirituality is more typical of the young and 
the well educated than of the elderly and the poorly educated (e.g., Becker et al., 1997; 
Stark and Bainbridge, 1985; Houtman and Mascini, 2002) can easily be reconciled with 
the hypothesis that increasing levels of post-traditionalism drive the spiritual revolution. 
As it happens, the young and the well educated stand out as two of the most post-
traditional demographic categories. To cite the most influential example only, Inglehart 
(1977, 1990, 1997) demonstrates that ‘postmaterialism’ is especially found among the 
younger age cohorts and the well educated and that it is strongly related to post-
traditionalism, conceived of as a rejection of traditional values pertaining to gender 
roles, sexuality, child-rearing and so forth (1997: 47). Studies into the propensity to 
obey authorities have always arrived at precisely the same conclusion: the young and 
the well educated are least likely to do so (see Houtman, 2003, for a review of the 
relevant studies). The spiritual affinities of the young and the well educated seem 
attributable to their high levels of post-traditionalism, in short. 
 Besides the young and the well educated, however, women of course also stand 
out with high levels of affinity with spirituality. This constitutes a difficult problem of 
explanation, because men and women do not differ with regard to post-traditionalism 
(e.g., Houtman, 2003; Houtman and Mascini, 2002). As a consequence, unlike those of 
the young and the well educated, women’s affinities with spirituality cannot simply be 
attributed to a high level of post-traditionalism. Instead, gendering the theory of 
detraditionalisation is called for, so as to give due to the circumstance that 
detraditionalisation means different things to men and women. 
 And indeed, detraditionalisation is likely to engender gender-specific burdens 
and anxieties (see also Woodhead, 2005, forthcoming 2006). Whereas traditional male 
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gender roles virtually coincide with the role of the breadwinner, traditional female 
gender roles, organised around the provision of care for others, are defined precisely in 
contrast to this work role. Although due to the more general process of 
detraditionalisation discussed above, normative acceptance of those traditional gender 
roles has declined, this does not mean that traditional gender arrangements and role 
expectations have dissolved altogether. As a consequence, many women who reject 
traditional gender roles still find themselves confronted with the corresponding role 
expectations and face a ‘second shift’ when returning home after a day’s work 
(Hochschild, 1989; see also: Hochschild, 1997). 
Even apart from the double weight on their shoulders this produces, women’s 
work experiences acquire radically different meanings from those of men, because they 
are also measured against traditional female gender roles that situate women in the 
domain of the household and the family: ‘In the space of a few generations, women 
have made a leap between … two frames of reference which men have never 
experienced in the same way’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1992: 75). 
Detraditionalisation produces burdens and anxieties for working post-traditional 
women, in short, to which working post-traditional men remain by and large immune. 
Although the domain of work, increasingly invaded by women during the last 
few decades, is likely to be of overriding importance, other life spheres also add to post-
traditional women’s burdens and anxieties. The erosion of traditional female sexual 
prohibitions, for instance, engenders a new experience of the sexual domain: ‘Without a 
strict “no” imposed from the outside, (women) must increasingly find their own rules 
and behaviour’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1992: 69). Contraception by means of ‘the 
pill’, for instance, requires rational and conscious planning in advance, that easily 
contradicts with a desire for romanticism – to ‘simply let it happen’ when romance 
strikes like lightning. 
Even though the loss of the protective cloak of ‘pre-given’ meaning and identity 
creates tensions and anxieties for men and women alike, women are substantially more 
likely to become caught up in new webs of contradiction and ambiguity, in short (see 
also Bobel, 2002). Post-traditional women are therefore more likely than post-traditional 
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men to be haunted by the questions of meaning and identity that are evoked by 
detraditionalisation and that stimulate late-modern individuals to explore the depths of 
their souls – ‘What is it that I really want?’, ‘Is this really the sort of life I want to live?’, 
‘What sort of person am I, really?’. Post-traditional women are more likely than post-
traditional men to embark on a spiritual quest and sacralise their selves, in short. 
 
Testing the Gendered Theory of Detraditionalisation 
We test the gendered theory of detraditionalisation by means of a second series of 
multilevel analyses. Following Houtman (2003: 83-102) and Houtman and Mascini 
(2002), post-traditionalism is operationalised by combining three measures that tap 
acceptance or rejection of traditional moral values (i.e., acceptance or rejection of the 
traditional hierarchical relationship between parents and children, of traditional values 
pertaining to sexuality and of traditional male and female gender roles) with Inglehart’s 
index for postmaterialism. 
 First, self-direction or conformity as a parental value is measured by means of 
respondents’ selection of a maximum of five from a list of qualities that may be 
encouraged in children. Their evaluation of six of those qualities is used here: 
‘determination/perseverance,’ ‘imagination’ and ‘independence’ (indicating ‘self-
direction’) and ‘obedience,’ ‘religious faith’ and ‘good manners’ (indicating 
‘conformity’). With all of those qualities coded either 0 (‘not chosen’) or 1 (‘chosen’), 
the more goals one selects from the former three and the less from the latter three, the 
higher one’s level of post-traditionalism.10
 Second, sexual permissiveness is measured as judgements about the 
acceptability of five activities: married men/women having an affair, sex under the legal 
age of consent, homosexuality, prostitution and abortion. Scores range from ‘never 
justified’ (1) to ‘always justified’ (10) and high scores are taken to indicate high levels 
of post-traditionalism.11
 Third, three questions are used to measure the degree to which traditional gender 
roles are accepted or rejected. The first two are statements that ‘a woman has to have 
children to be fulfilled’ and that ‘a single woman should have the right to have a child’ 
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and the third is a question about whether or not one feels that marriage is an out-of-date 
institution.12  
 Fourth and finally, Inglehart’s index for postmaterialism is constructed on the 
basis of the prioritisation of four political goals by the respondents. Those who select 
‘Giving the people more say in important government decisions’ and ‘Protecting free 
speech’ as the two most important goals are coded ‘postmaterialists’ and those who 
choose ‘Maintaining order in the nation’ and ‘Fighting rising prices’ are coded 
‘materialists’. Remaining respondents are coded as a mixed category in between.13
 As expected, those four measures are strongly related among themselves. A 
second-order factor analysis produces a first factor that explains 46 per cent of the 
common variance with factor loadings of 0.65 (rejection of traditional gender roles), 
0.59 (postmaterialism), 0.68 (emphasis on self-direction rather than conformity as a 
parental value) and 0.77 (sexual permissiveness). Scores for post-traditionalism are 
therefore assigned as mean standardised scores to 98.7 per cent of the respondents with 
valid scores on at least three of those four measures. In effect, those who are 
postmaterialists, critical of traditional gender roles, critical of conformity as a parental 
value and sexually permissive receive highest scores on post-traditionalism. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Our second series of multilevel analyses confirms the gendered version of the theory of 
detraditionalisation. As expected, the higher levels of spirituality in the most recent 
period are caused by a process of detraditionalisation (model 2 in Table 4) and precisely 
those who stand out as most post-traditional embrace spirituality (model 4 as compared 
to model 2). Moreover, all affinity with spirituality of the well educated and a 
substantial part of that of the younger birth cohorts is caused by post-traditionalism 
(model 4 as compared to model 2). Whereas traditional men and traditional women are 
equally unlikely to embrace spirituality, post-traditional women are more likely to do so 
than post-traditional men (i.e., the significant interaction effect of post-traditionalism 
and female gender in model 4). Hence, the female drift toward spirituality applies to 
post-traditional women only. This confirms our theory, based on the assumption that 
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detraditionalisation produces stronger tensions and anxieties in post-traditional women, 
making them more likely to sacralise their selves than post-traditional men.14
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Correlations between post-traditionalism and spirituality have been computed for men 
and women separately to be able to inspect the statistical relationships that underlie the 
interaction effect of gender and post-traditionalism in more detail (Table 5). Post-
traditionalism is positively related to spirituality in each of the fourteen countries 
studied. Although this applies to men and women alike, the relationship is stronger for 
women than men in all of those countries, with the single exception of Sweden (in 
which there is no difference). It is evident that those findings confirm our gendered 
version of the theory of detraditionalisation: spirituality is more typically embraced by 
post-traditional women than by post-traditional men. 
 
 
Conclusion and Debate 
 
Traditionally considered as inevitably incompatible, many today conceive of modernity 
and religion as mutually accommodating. Woodhead and Heelas’ anthology Religion in 
Modern Times (2000), for instance, juxtaposes theories of secularisation and theories of 
sacralisation, rejecting the idea that those are necessarily incompatible. Indeed, our 
findings indicate that the decline of the Christian churches in most Western countries 
has gone along with an increasing sacralisation of the self. What we are witnessing 
today, then, is not so much a disappearance of the sacred, but rather its dramatic 
relocation from Christian heaven to the deeper layers of the self.  
And yet, theoretical controversy persists. Heelas et al. (2004) predict a future in 
which spirituality supersedes religion, we ourselves envisage one in which religion does 
not only give way to spirituality, but to secularism, too (Houtman and Mascini, 2002), 
and Bruce (2002) forecasts a by and large secular future.15 Two issues seem vitally 
important for pushing the frontiers of knowledge further forward and clarifying the 
futures of spirituality and secularism: processes of socialisation through which people 
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come to adopt a spiritual discourse about the self and the role played by problems of 
meaning and identity in making people amenable to such a discourse. 
Processes of socialisation into a spiritual discourse about the self have been 
seriously neglected in empirical research, probably due to sociology of religion’s 
orthodoxy – originating from Luckmann (1967) – that spirituality is ‘not 
institutionalised’, ‘purely privatised’, and ‘strictly individualistic’, so that socialisation 
into spirituality ‘is unnecessary and it is impossible’ (Bruce, 2002: 99). As we have 
emphasised above, however, the ethic of self-spirituality constitutes a remarkably 
coherent doctrine of being and wellbeing, and it would therefore be sociologically naive 
to assume that no processes of socialisation are taking place. This is not to suggest that 
this type of socialisation remains necessarily confined to the spiritual milieu, of course. 
With spirituality’s strongly increased significance in the public domain of work, for 
instance, even management courses may today stimulate one to embark on a spiritual 
journey to the deeper layers of the self (Aupers and Houtman, 2006). Be this as it may, 
predictions about the future of spirituality cannot be made without insight into the social 
mechanisms through which it spreads, but precisely this is a badly neglected research 
area (see however: Luhrmann, 1989; Hammer, 2001, 2004; Hanegraaff, 2001). 
The role played by problems of meaning and identity constitutes a second 
important issue for future research. Post-traditionalists may after all either embrace 
spirituality or adopt a secularist posture (Houtman and Mascini, 2002) and we have 
argued that the experience of problems of meaning and identity decides which of both 
occurs. Our finding that, as predicted, post-traditional women more typically embrace 
spirituality than post-traditional men is consistent with this argument, but does not 
necessarily prove it. It is vital, therefore, to study in future research whether this 
difference is really caused by post-traditional women being haunted more severely by 
problems of meaning and identity, as our gendered version of the theory of 
detraditionalisation suggests. Such a study promises not only highly relevant insights 
into what causes post-traditionalists to convert to either secularism or spirituality, but 
above all constitutes the definitive test of the proposed solution to the New Age gender 
puzzle. 
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The Spiritual Revolution and the New Age Gender Puzzle 
The Sacralisation of the Self in Late Modernity (1980-2000) 
 
[Tables] 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Five indicators for affinity with spirituality (N=61,352). 
Indicators for affinity with spirituality % no affinity % affinity % valid 
 
•  Believes in the existence of a spirit or life force. 
 
•  Believes in a life after death, but thinks that the 
 churches do not give adequate answers to people’s 
 spiritual needs. 
 
•  Believes in re-incarnation, but does not believe in 
 God. 
 
•  Does not belong to a religious denomination, but 
 does not consider oneself a convinced atheist either.
 
•  Does not consider oneself a convinced atheist, but 
 has not very much or no confidence in the churches.
 
 
68.0 
 
 
 
83.7 
 
 
97.0 
 
 
85.0 
 
 
58.9 
 
32.0 
 
 
 
16.3 
 
 
3.0 
 
 
15.0 
 
 
41.1 
 
 
90.3 
 
 
 
69.9 
 
 
69.9 
 
 
92.3 
 
 
89.7 
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Table 2. Mean affinity with spirituality in fourteen western countries in 1981, 1990, and 2000 (N=56,513). 
Country      1981 1990 2000 Total Change (Pearson’s r)1
 
France 
Great Britain 
West-Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Spain 
Ireland 
United States 
Canada 
Norway 
Sweden 
Iceland 
 
 
1.61 
1.83 
1.57 
1.74 
2.26 
1.43 
1.35 
1.51 
1.02 
1.04 
1.89 
1.53 
1.78 
1.88 
 
 
1.97 
2.33 
1.87 
1.46 
2.76 
1.71 
1.69 
1.67 
1.27 
1.44 
1.89 
1.77 
1.84 
1.53 
 
 
2.07 
1.97 
1.70 
1.37 
3.03 
1.62 
2.10 
1.86 
1.53 
1.57 
1.71 
- 
2.29 
1.65 
 
 
1.90 
2.07 
1.74 
1.50 
2.67 
1.58 
1.76 
1.67 
1.26 
1.29 
1.82 
1.65 
1.97 
1.70 
 
 
0.11*** 
0.04** 
0.03** 
-0.10*** 
0.16*** 
0.05** 
0.17*** 
0.09*** 
0.18*** 
0.17*** 
-0.04** 
0.09*** 
0.14*** 
-0.06*** 
Total      1.55 1.77 1.86 1.72 0.08***
 
1 One-sided test 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3. The spiritual revolution as a historical change process (multilevel analysis, betas). 
Predictors     (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Intercept 
 
Contextual level 
1981 (reference category) 
1990 
2000 
 
Individual level (fixed effects) 
Year of birth 
Age 
 
 
0.020 
 
0.024 
 
 
 
0.063 
0.085* 
 
 
0.025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.222* 
0.031 
 
0.027 
 
 
 
0.032 
0.016 
 
 
0.189*** 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Variance contextual level 
Variance explained contextual level (%) 
Variance individual level 
Variance explained individual level (%) 
157230.3 
0.063 
0.0 
0.943 
0.0 
157226.3 
0.058 
7.9 
0.943 
0.0 
 154168.7 
0.059 
6.3 
0.912 
3.3 
 154168.3 
0.058 
7.9 
0.912 
3.3 
 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4. Explaining the spiritual revolution from detraditionalisation (multilevel analysis, betas). 
Predictors     (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Intercept 
 
Contextual level 
1981 (reference category) 
1990 
2000 
Mean post-traditionalism 
 
Individual level (fixed effects) 
Year of birth 
Education 
Female 
Post-traditionalism 
Post-traditionalism*female 
 
Individual level (random effects) 
Year of birth 
Education 
Female 
Post-traditionalism 
Post-traditionalism*female 
 
 
0.020 
 
 
 
0.025 
 
 
 
0.022 
-0.010 
0.151***
 
0.021 
 
 
 
-0.000 
-0.064 
0.135** 
 
 
0.170***
0.068***
 
 
 
 
 
0.004***
0.002* 
 
 
0.026 
 
 
 
0.005 
-0.038 
0.055 
 
 
0.102*** 
-0.006 
-0.015 
0.276*** 
0.036*** 
 
 
0.004*** 
0.001* 
0.002** 
0.008*** 
0.000 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Variance contextual level 
Variance explained contextual level (%) 
Variance individual level 
Variance explained individual level (%) 
157230.3 
0.063 
0.0 
0.943 
0.0 
157213.9 
0.042 
33.3 
0.943 
0.0 
 148670.9 
0.043 
31.7 
0.901 
4.5 
143236.0 
0.036 
42.9 
0.837 
11.2 
 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5. Zero-order and partial correlations of post-traditionalism and affinity with 
spirituality by gender and country. 
 Pearson’s r1 Partial r2
Country Men Women N Men Women N 
 
France 
Great Britain 
West-Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Spain 
Ireland 
United States 
Canada 
Norway 
Sweden 
Iceland 
 
 
 0.25 
 0.21 
 0.31 
 0.32 
 0.34 
 0.16 
 0.26 
 0.21 
 0.40 
 0.27 
 0.31 
 0.29 
 0.15 
 0.20 
 
 0.28 
 0.28 
 0.39 
 0.44 
 0.41 
 0.27 
 0.35 
 0.31 
 0.45 
 0.31 
 0.32 
 0.42 
 0.21 
 0.24 
 
 3,614 
 3,454 
 4,065 
 5,172 
 3,086 
 2,948 
 5,390 
 8,015 
 3,159 
 5,075 
 4,158 
 2,392 
 2,824 
 2,549 
 
 0.18
 0.19
 0.27
 0.30
 0.27
 0.11
 0.22
 0.19
 0.30
 0.24
 0.27
 0.25
 0.13
 0.17
 
 0.22 
 0.23 
 0.31 
 0.40 
 0.33 
 0.20 
 0.27 
 0.21 
 0.37 
 0.27 
 0.28 
 0.34 
 0.13 
 0.18 
 
3,506 
3,294 
4,018 
5,105 
3,041 
2,913 
5,108 
7,447 
3,056 
4,742 
4,055 
2,326 
2,663 
2,466 
Total  0.27  0.35  55,901  0.23  0.29 53,736 
 
1. All zero-order correlations significant at p < 0.001 (one-sided test). 
2. All partial correlations, controlling for year of birth and education, significant at p < 
0.001 (one-sided test). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 Heelas et al. only wish to speak of a ‘spiritual revolution’ when more people 
participate in the spiritual milieu than in the Christian congregational domain. Because 
in Kendall, United Kingdom, where they conducted their ‘body count’, five times as 
many people are involved in the latter as compared to the former, they conclude that ‘it 
is thus perfectly clear that a spiritual revolution has not taken place’ (2004: 45). In the 
current chapter, we use the notion of a ‘spiritual revolution’ differently. Following 
Inglehart’s (1977) conceptualisation of the ‘silent revolution’, we do not consider the 
achievement of a majority position decisive, but rather the occurrence of a process of 
historical expansion that operates by way of cohort replacement and is caused by a 
medium-long term process of change that is unlikely to reverse. 
 
2 There is an ongoing discussion about whether the neo-pagan movement (most notably 
Wicca) is a movement in its own right or part of the New Age movement. Although 
some argue that the two should be treated as different (cf. Adler, 1979; Graham, 1997; 
Pearson, 1998) and are obviously not identical (York, 1995), the most common position 
seems to be that neo-paganism is a distinguishable subculture within the broader New 
Age movement (cf. Hanegraaff, 1996; Heelas, 1996). Because even specialists in neo-
paganism such as Berger (1999: 5) and Luhrmann (1989: 30-31) take this position, we 
regard spirituality as affiliated with ‘New Age’, because New Age includes neo-
paganism. 
 
3 This is of course not to suggest that survey research enables one to estimate how many 
people are involved in spirituality (or traditionalism, racism, or whatever). This is 
impossible, because the percentage found depends on two more or less arbitrary 
decisions: 1) What particular items from a principally unlimited universe are to be used 
to measure it? and 2) How much agreement with the selected set of items is necessary to 
be able to speak of a ‘real’ New Ager (traditionalist, racist, or whatever)? Depending on 
decisions regarding those two questions (with especially the first one supplying the 
researcher with enormous degrees of freedom), one can in principle produce any 
percentage between 0 and 100. What survey research does permit, however, is studying 
whether – given the way one has decided to measure affinity with spirituality – the 
average score on this scale or index increases or decreases across time. This is precisely 
what we will do in this chapter. 
 
4 In a similar vein, the late Bryan Wilson argued already thirty years ago that the post-
Christian cults ‘represent, in the American phrase, “the religion of your choice”, the 
highly privatized preference that reduces religion to the significance of pushpin, poetry, 
or popcorns’ (1976: 96; see for another example: Becker et al., 1997). 
 
5 Interviewed in the context of a previous study (Aupers and Houtman, 2003). 
 
6 For re-unified Germany in the data collection of 2000, we have included only the 
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Länder that used to be part of West-Germany in our data analysis. 
  
7 With a mere five crude dichotomous indicators, it is hardly surprising that Cronbach’s 
alpha is not higher than 0.42. Nevertheless, all zero-order correlations between the 
indicators are positive and significant (p<0.001) and item-total correlations range from 
0.17 through 0.30. A principal component analyses yields a first factor that explains 30 
per cent of the common variance. The two lowest factor loadings are 0.44 (for belief in 
a spirit or life force and for belief in a life after death, while feeling that the churches do 
not give adequate answers to people’s spiritual needs) and all others are higher than 
0.50. We feel that those findings justify our decision to combine those five indicators 
into a crude index for spirituality. 
 
8 Probably due to a different operationalization, this finding for Canada is inconsistent 
with Bibby’s (2002) observation that more Canadians say they’re spiritual today than 30 
years ago. 
 
9 Disentangling ‘age effects’ and ‘cohort effects’ is impossible, of course, when ‘one-
shot-survey data’ are analysed. The correlation between age and birth year is then 
exactly -1.00. Because even with a 20-year period we face a strong negative correlation 
between both variables, the extremely large sample is helpful in preventing problems of 
multicollinearity. 
 
10 An overall factor analysis produces a single factor with an eigenvalue higher than 
one, explaining 28 per cent of the common variance. All six factor loadings are higher 
than 0.40 and the signs of the loadings for the indicators for self-direction are positive, 
whereas those for conformity are negative. If a factor loading for a particular indicator 
was below 0.30 for a country-year combination, it has been coded missing for that 
particular country-year combination. After reversing the scores on the indicators tapping 
conformity, scores have been assigned as mean standardised scores to all respondents 
with at most two missing values. This produces valid scores for more than 99 per cent 
of the respondents. 
 
11 An overall factor analysis produces a single factor with an eigenvalue higher than 
one, explaining no less than 54 per cent of the common variance. All factor loadings are 
higher than 0.65 and scores have been assigned as mean scores to all respondents with 
no more than two missing values, yielding valid scores for 96.9 per cent of the 
respondents. 
 
12 Response categories for those three questions are, respectively, yes/no, 
yes/depends/no (recoded into yes versus depends/no) and yes/no. An overall factor 
analysis produces a single factor with an eigenvalue higher than one that explains 40 per 
cent of the common variance with factor loadings of 0.41, 0.73 and 0.71, respectively. 
Scores have been assigned to 97.6 per cent of the respondents with at most one missing 
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value. 
 
13 Valid scores are available for 89.9 per cent of the respondents. 
 
14 Finally, the strengths of the effects of birth year, gender and post-traditionalism vary 
between contexts (model 4, random effects): they are stronger in some years and 
countries and weaker in others. Additional analyses, not shown in Table 4, point out that 
those differences cannot be attributed to the circumstance that some years and countries 
are more post-traditional than others. 
 
15 The exact nature of secularism is a seriously neglected issue in the research literature, 
however. Due to the strong focus on the decline of the Christian churches in the west, 
‘few attempts have been made to look at the other side of the equation, at what has been 
called the “left-over”, if one may say so’ (Knoblauch, 2003: 268). Whereas 
secularisation theory assumes that religious worldviews are increasingly being replaced 
by rationalist ones, there are also indications that rationalist conceptions of the self 
increasingly give way to postmodern ones (e.g., Gergen, 1991). 
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